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Case No. 20160261-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

ZACHARY RIGBY,
Defendant/Petitioner.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court
of Appeals in State v. Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, 369 P.3d 127 (Addendum A).
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5)
(West 2009).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Does the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the
Utah Constitution’s search and seizure provision, art. I, § 14, require an exigency apart from the mobility of the automobile?
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews de novo
the decision of the court of appeals. State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶13, 296 P.3d
673. “That said, ‘[t]he correctness of the court of appeals’ decision turns, in

part, on whether it accurately reviewed the trial court’s decision under the
appropriate standard of review.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50,
¶15, 144 P.3d 1096). A trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is a
mixed question of law and fact. The court’s interpretation of the Utah Constitution is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Casey, 2002
UT 29, ¶19, 44 P.3d 756. The court’s other legal conclusions are also reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶17, 332 P.3d 937. But its
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Const. art. I, § 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts.
In March 2013, Deputy Brian Groves of the Cache County Sheriff’s
Office stopped the car Defendant was driving for running a stop sign. R82.
Upon approaching the car, Deputy Groves “immediately detect[ed] the
odor of both burnt and fresh marijuana coming from the vehicle.” R82-83.
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During the stop, Deputy Groves also noticed that Defendant and his two
passengers were exhibiting “physical indicators of recent marijuana use,”
R82-83, including bloodshot eyes, droopy eyelids, a stoned look, and extreme nervousness. R60; Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, ¶3. A drug K-9 unit was
summoned to the scene, arrived shortly after, and “positively indicated on
the vehicle.” R83. Officers thereafter searched the car and—after finding a
small metal pipe for smoking marijuana and plastic bag of fresh marijuana—arrested Defendant. R60,83; Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, ¶3.
B.

Summary of proceedings.
Defendant was charged with (1) driving with a measurable controlled

substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor, (2) possession of a controlled
substance in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, (3) possession of
drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, and (4)
failure to stop at a stop sign, a class C misdemeanor. R1-2. Defendant
moved to suppress the drug evidence. R39-44. Following briefing and argument, R51-55,63-65,76, the trial court denied the motion on two independent grounds: (1) the warrantless search of the car was justified under
the State automobile exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) the warrantless search of the car was justified by probable cause for Defendant’s
search and arrest. R82-85 (Addendum C).
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Defendant thereafter pled guilty to driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor, and possession of a
controlled substance, reduced to a class B misdemeanor, and the remaining
charges were dismissed. R93-95. In so pleading, Defendant reserved his
right to appeal the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress. R95.
Defendant was sentenced to 180 days in jail on both counts, with all but two
days suspended, and placed on supervised probation for one year. R107-08.
On appeal, Defendant challenged only the trial court’s conclusion that
the search was justified by the State automobile exception. Rigby, 2016 UT
App 42, ¶6. He did not challenge the trial court’s other basis for denying his
motion—i.e., that the warrantless search of the car was justified by the drug
arrest. See id. at ¶¶ 7-29. Even though Defendant failed to challenge all of
the bases for the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion, the court of
appeals nevertheless addressed his sole challenge and held that the State
automobile exception mirrors the federal exception: “we decline to depart
from the path of federal law and conclude that under the automobile exception, ... the law enforcement officers in this case were only required to have
probable cause to justify the search of Rigby’s vehicle.” Id. at ¶28.
Defendant petitioned for a writ of certiorari and, after the State stipulated thereto, this Court granted review.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court denied Defendant’s suppression motion for two reasons: (1) the warrantless search of the car was justified under the State automobile exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) the warrantless
search of the car was justified by virtue of probable cause supporting Defendant’s arrest. Defendant challenged only one of those grounds on direct
appeal. Accordingly, any decision on that ground cannot result in reversal
of the trial court’s order. This Court should therefore affirm the court of appeals’ decision on the alternative ground that Defendant has failed to
demonstrate why the trial court’s order should be reversed.
In any event, the court of appeals correctly held that the State automobile exception to the warrant requirement is the same as the federal exception. The framers of the Utah Constitution, and the people who ratified
it, intended that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution guarantee the
same protections as those afforded under the Fourth Amendment. Defendant has not demonstrated otherwise. Indeed, the history of Section 14, as
well as the historical case law governing searches of vehicles on the thoroughfares, demonstrates that a warrant is not required for mobile vehicles
stopped so long as there exists probable cause to believe contraband will be
found. No exigency apart from the mobility of the vehicle is required.
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ARGUMENT
I.

This Court should affirm the court of appeals’ opinion
on the alternative ground that Defendant failed on direct
appeal to challenge all of the grounds upon which the
district court denied his motion to suppress.
This Court should affirm the court of appeals’ decision affirming the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, but should do so on alternative grounds. The issue raised on direct appeal, and again on certiorari review, was not the sole basis for the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. The district court denied the suppression motion on two,
independent grounds—either of which supported its ruling. The court of
appeals’ opinion is thus advisory, and would, in no event affect the district
court’s ruling. This Court should thus affirm on the alternative ground that
Defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying his
suppression motion.
This Court has observed that “one of the most fundamental principles
of the appellate process” is that the appellant “identify ... flaws in the district court’s order that require[ ] reversal.” Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶4, 194
P.3d 903. If an appellant “fails to attack the district court’s reasons” for
denying relief requested in the trial court, he “cannot demonstrate that the
district court erred” in denying that relief and he cannot prevail on appeal.
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Golden Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 257, ¶17, 241 P.3d 375.
Utah appellate courts thus “will not reverse a ruling of the trial court that
rests on independent alternative grounds where the appellant challenges
only one of those grounds.” Salt Lake County v. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Development Corp., 2013 UT App 30, 297 P.3d 38.
Nor is it proper for the Court to opine on issues that are not dispositive. Where any direction the Court “ ‘may provide ... may ultimately prove
to be irrelevant,’ or where there are ‘possible circumstances under which
[the Court] would not need to address [a constitutional claim],’ to do so
would be to impermissibly render an advisory opinion.” Clegg v. Wasatch
County, 2010 UT 5,¶26, 227 P.3d 1243 (quoting Pett v. Autoliv ASP Inc., 2005
UT 2, ¶5, 106 P.3d 705, and State v. Ortiz, 1999 UT 84, ¶4, 987 P.2d 39).
Defendant argued below that, unlike the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the State automobile exception requires exigency apart from a vehicle’s mobility to justify a warrantless search. R3944,63-64. He contended that there was no such exigency here and that the
warrantless search of the car thus violated Section 14 of the Utah Constitution’s Declaration of Rights. R39-44,63-64,120-26.
The district denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, but on two independent grounds. The court ruled that under the automobile exception ar-
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ticulated in State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), the warrantless
search was justified because the officers had probable cause, “the vehicle
was mobile[,] and the occupants were alerted to police presence.” R83-84.1
But the court ruled that the warrantless search was also justified for another
independent reason. In its oral ruling, the court explained that the question
is whether an officer can “arrest a person and then search the vehicle for
suspected contraband ... which constituted the probable cause for the arrest
in the first place.” R138-39. The court concluded that an officer can. It ruled
that such a search is “a natural extension of the person of the Defendant”
because “probable cause existed to question and search the Defendant for
illegal drugs,” R84, and also to “take [him] from the vehicle and arrest him,”
R140.
The district court’s ruling that the warrantless search of Defendant’s
car was justified by the probable cause for Defendant’s arrest is consistent
with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Arizona v. Gant, the United
States Supreme Court held that “circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to beTwo signed, but different, orders denying the motion to suppress
appear in the record. R78-81; R82-85. The district court, however, struck the
first order. R90. In addressing the State automobile exception, the court of
appeals mistakenly relied on language from the district court’s stricken order. See Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, ¶4 (quoting R80).
1
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lieve evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’ ” 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 632 (2004)). Gant explained that “when a recent occupant is arrested for
a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle
contains relevant evidence.” Id. at 343-44. But in other cases, like here, “the
offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.” Id. at 344.
The district court did not rely on Gant, but came to the same conclusion under its analysis of the Utah Constitution’s reasonableness requirement. R129 (observing that “the case before us is a Utah constitutional
case”). The court reasoned that “under the totality of the circumstances and
in balancing the interests of the State and the Defendant’s privacy, the
search of the vehicle in this matter was reasonable and was therefore lawful
and valid.” R84; accord R141-42. The court explained that under such circumstances, it is not reasonable to “burden officers with using their mobile
technology just because it exists in their vehicles.” R84; accord R140.
On direct appeal, Defendant challenged only the district court’s application of the automobile exception under Anderson. He did not challenge
the district court’s independent State ground for denying the motion based
on the same rationale applied in Gant. Accordingly, the court of appeals’
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opinion on the automobile exception is advisory only. No matter what that
court held on the automobile exception, it could not affect the district
court’s order denying the motion to suppress. So too on certiorari review.
Even if this Court were to disagree with the court of appeals’ opinion on the
automobile exception, that holding would not be sufficient to reverse the
district court’s judgment and would amount to no more than an advisory
opinion. This Court should therefore affirm the court of appeals’ opinion,
but on the alternative ground that Defendant failed to demonstrate why
“the district court’s order ... require[s] reversal.” Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶4.
II.

In any event, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that
the automobile exception to the Utah Constitution’s warrant requirement should be different that the federal automobile exception.
This Court has observed that “federal Fourth Amendment protections
may differ from those guaranteed our citizens by [Section 14 of] our state
constitution.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 506 (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); accord State v.
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶34, 162 P.3d 1106. But as recognized by the court of
appeals below, this Court has historically “considered the protections afforded to be one and the same.” State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah
1988). Even in those rare cases where the Court has examined an issue un-
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der an independent state constitutional analysis, it has generally adopted
the Fourth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 19,
996 P.2d 546 (adopting the “analysis and rationale” of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in examining administrative highway checkpoints); Watts,
750 P.2d at 1221 (holding that like the Fourth Amendment, Section 14 does
not protect against unreasonable private searches); Sims v. Collection Div. of
the Utah State Tax Comm’n, 841 P.2d 6, 10, 14-15 (Utah 1992) (plurality opinion) (adopting analysis and rationale of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), in concluding that quasi-criminal proceedings are
subject to the exclusionary rule).
In only one circumstance has a majority of this Court held that Section 14 provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. In State v.
Thompson, the court held that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, Section 14
recognizes a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records. 810 P.2d 415,
417-18 (Utah 1991) (rejecting the rationale of United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435 442 (1976)).2 One other case often cited as an example of providing

The protection afforded to bank records, however, was also provided by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-45(1) (1990) (providing that the
State may not obtain bank records by subpoena “without first obtaining
written permission from the person whose financial transactions or other
records of financial condition are to be examined, or obtaining an order
from a court of competent jurisdiction permitting access to the information”).
2
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greater protections garnered the support of only a plurality: State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460, 464-71 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (concluding, in essence,
that a car thief has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the stolen car).
In sum, “the truism that article I, section 14 may provide greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Worwood,
2007 UT 47, ¶19, 164 P.3d 397, does not mean that it provides broader protections generally.
A. When interpreting article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, this Court should first look to the purpose and intent of
its framers and the people who ratified it.
The threshold question is whether this Court should concern itself at
all with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when examining Section 14, and
if so, under what circumstances it should “depart from federal Fourth
Amendment doctrine and chart [its] own course.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,
¶16 n.2, 2004 UT 95. The answer to that question has long evaded a majority
of this Court. See Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8 (observing that “a somewhat
different construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating
this state’s citizenry from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given
to the fourth amendment by federal courts”); State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d
1229, 1235 (Utah 1996) (Russon, J., joined by Howe, J., for plurality) (“Utah
courts should construe article I, section 14 in a manner similar to construc-
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tions of the Fourth Amendment except in compelling circumstances”), id. at
1239-40 (Stewart, J., concurring in result) (opining that “Utah ought not depart from federal search and seizure law in construing article I, section 14
simply because of some inconsistency in that law, or minor disagreement
with it,” but declining “to adopt the ‘compelling circumstances’ standard”);
id. at 1241 (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting) (rejecting state constitutional analysis that is “presumptively dependent on federal law”). This
Court should answer that question by turning to an examination of the intent and purpose of the framers who adopted the state constitution and of
the people who ratified it.
“It is a cardinal rule of construction that constitutions should be construed in light of their framers’ intent.” American Fork v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d
1069, 1072 (Utah 1985). In discerning that intent, “the starting point should
always be the plain meaning of the textual language” itself. American Bush
v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶115, 140 P.3d 1235 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, at ¶ 37.
This textual analysis should also include an examination of “other [related]
constitutional provisions.” West, 872 P.2d at 1015.
When the intent of the framers cannot be clearly discerned from the
text of a provision and related provisions, the Court has “inform[ed] its tex-
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tual interpretation with historical evidence of the framers’ intent.” American
Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶10. This may include (1) “‘the background out of which
[the provision] arose,’” id. (citation omitted); (2) the debates at the 1895 Utah
Constitutional Convention, American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069,
1072-73 (Utah 1985); (3) the historical source of the provision, such as the
common law, id. at 1071-73; (4) statutory law enacted by the first Utah Legislature, P.I.E. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Utah
1988); (5) “court decisions made contemporaneously to the framing of
Utah’s constitution in sister states with similar . . . constitutional provisions,” American Bush, 2006 UT 40, at ¶ 11; (6) “the unique history” of the
state, Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993);
and (7) the “state’s particular . . . traditions,” West v. Thomson Newspapers,
872 P.2d 999, 1013 (Utah 1994).
In Tiedemann, the Court observed that historical arguments “do not
represent a sine qua non in constitutional analysis.” 2007 UT 49, at ¶ 37. The
Court held that state constitutional analysis may also “rely on whatever assistance legitimate sources may provide in the interpretive process.” Id.
This is a marked departure from Utah jurisprudence. The Court thus suggested that it “‘may also look to . . . sister state law, and policy arguments in
the form of economic and sociological materials to assist . . . in arriving at a
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proper interpretation of the provision in question.’” Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,
at ¶ 37 (citation omitted). But in Whitehead—the source of this language—
the Court explained that “[e]ach of these types of evidence can help in divining the intent and purpose of the framers, a critical aspect of any constitutional interpretation.” Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 921 n.6 (emphasis added). In
other words, despite its expressed willingness to look at non-textual or nonhistorical evidence, the Court in Whitehead viewed “divining the intent and
purpose of the framers” as the ultimate purpose for looking at those
sources.
Tiedemann suggested that federal analysis which is flawed, confusing,
or inconsistent may also justify independent analysis. Tiedemann, 2007 UT
49, at ¶ 37 (citing State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 467-70 (Utah 1990) (plurality
opinion), and State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988)). But a perceived flaw in federal analysis is not a principled basis for departing from
the federal standard. Indeed, interpreting the state provision differently
simply because the court believes the federal analysis to be flawed is not an
interpretive framework at all. It is reactive and result-oriented, and is irrelevant to a determination of the framers’ intent.
As explained in Justice Durrant’s concurring opinion in American
Bush, “a historical analysis of our state constitution is the most appropriate
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interpretive course to follow when confronted with constitutional questions.” American Bush, 2006 UT 40, at ¶ 86 (Durrant, J., concurring). In this
context, it is the most appropriate method for determining whether Section
14 provides broader search and seizure protections than the Fourth
Amendment. This interpretive framework anchors the judicial enterprise
“to the text of the constitution as understood and intended by its framers
and the voters who ratified it” and “provides stability to state government
while remaining true to the principle that it is the people of this state who
should ultimately determine how our society should be structured.” Id. at
¶¶ 83-84; accord Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure
Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L.
Rev. 751, 774-80 (1993) [hereinafter “The Utah Example”] (endorsing “historically-based” approach that incorporates neutral principles).
B.

Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution was generally intended to provide the same protections afforded under the
Fourth Amendment.
An examination of the text, background, and history of article I, sec-

tion 14 reveals that its framers, and the people who ratified it, generally intended to guarantee the same protections afforded under the Fourth
Amendment.
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1. The text of Section 14 is the surest indication that the protections afforded thereunder were intended to mirror
those of the Fourth Amendment.
The language of Section 14 “contains the surest indication of the intent of its framers and the citizens of Utah who voted it into effect.” American Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶16. In all relevant respects, Section 14 is identical to
the Fourth Amendment. It differs only in punctuation, capitalization, and
the omission of the unnecessary “and” that precedes “particularly” in the
Fourth Amendment:
Fourth Amendment (differences identified with editing marks)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to
be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Utah Const. art. I, § 14.
Nothing in the text of Section 14 indicates any enlargement or expansion of rights beyond those afforded under the Fourth Amendment. Like the
Fourth Amendment, Section 14 secures the right of the people “against un-
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reasonable searches and seizures,” and like the Fourth Amendment, it requires that warrants be based “upon probable cause,” be “supported by
oath or affirmation,” and “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched[,]
and the person(s) or thing(s) to be seized.” Id. As further explained below,
this identity of language is strongly indicative of the framers’ intent to provide protections identical to those of the Fourth Amendment.
2. The evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision suggests that Utah’s framers intended to provide protections
that mirrored the Fourth Amendment.
The evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision also suggests
that the framers intended to provide Utah citizens with the same protections as those afforded under the Fourth Amendment. The constitutional
convention of 1895 represented the territory’s sixth attempt at statehood.
See Linda Thatcher, A Chronology of Utah Statehood, Beehive History 21, at 2832 (1995). The search and seizure provision of the territory’s six proposed
constitutions evolved from a version unlike the Fourth Amendment to a
version that, as discussed, is materially identical to the Fourth Amendment:
1849 Draft. The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches
and seizures.3

1849 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, Art. VIII, sec. 6, reproduced in Laws of Utah 44, 55 (1855) [hereinafter “1849 Draft Const., art.
VIII, § 6”].
3
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1862 Draft. The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches
and seizures.4
1872 Draft. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, and
the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized.5
1882 Draft. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place or places to be searched,
and the person or persons, and thing or things, to be seized.6
1887 Draft. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.7

1862 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, Art. II, sec. 5, as reported in THE DESERET NEWS, Jan. 29, 1862, at 242 [hereinafter “1862 Draft
Const., art. II, § 5.”].
4

1872 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. I, sec. 18, as reported in THE DESERET NEWS, Mar. 6, 1872, at 53 [hereinafter “1872 Draft
Const., art. I, § 18”].
5

1882 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. I, sec. 16, as reported in Constitution of the State of Utah: Adopted by the Convention,
April 27, 1882 [hereinafter “1882 Draft Const., art. I, § 16”].
6

1887 Draft Constitution of the State of Utah, art. I, sec. 19, as reported in THE DESERET NEWS, Jul. 13, 1887, at 412 [hereinafter “1887 Draft
Const., art. I, § 19”].
7
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1895. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized.8
The 1849 and 1862 drafts were identical, and included only a reasonableness clause. They did not include a warrant clause, as found in the
Fourth Amendment and almost all state constitutions of the time. See Stateby-State Comparison Chart [hereinafter “CC”] (Addendum B). And rather
than tracking the reasonableness language of the Fourth Amendment, the
1849/1862 version tracked the language found in the Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut constitutions (using active voice and referring to “possessions” rather than “effects”). See CC, B1-2.9
Subsequent drafts adopted the format of the Fourth Amendment, incorporating both a reasonableness clause and a warrant clause. These versions also abandoned the active voice/ “possessions” language of Delaware,
Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, in favor of Fourth Amendment phraseolo8

Utah Const. art. I, sec. 14; 2 Proceedings at 1856.

The constitutions of Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Maine, Michigan, and
Texas also substantially tracked the reasonableness clause language of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. See CC, at B2-7. The Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Ohio constitutions referred to “possessions” rather than “effects,” but used the passive “shall not be violated” language. See CC, at B45.
9
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gy. While similar to the Fourth Amendment, the 1872 version appears to
have “simply incorporated Nevada’s search and seizure guarantee.” Paul
G. Cassell, Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: The Irrelevance of the
Antipolygamy Raids, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995) [hereinafter “Antipolygamy
Raids”]. “More than 120 copies of the Nevada Constitution were printed and
distributed to the delegates” at the convention. Id. The Utah delegates
thereafter adopted a search and seizure provision that, but for some differences in capitalization, was identical to that found in the Nevada Constitution, with its somewhat unique and awkward language.10 It thus secured
the right against unreasonable “seizures and searches” and provided that
warrants may not issue “but on probable cause, . . . particularly describing
the place or places to be searched, and the person or persons, and thing or things to
be seized.” 1872 Draft Const., art. I, sec. 18 (emphasized language denoting
differences from Fourth Amendment); CC, at B9.
The 1882 version abandoned the “seizures and searches” language of
the Nevada model, adopting instead the “searches and seizures” language
of the Fourth Amendment. See 1882 Draft Const., art. I, § 16. Other than
some punctuation differences, it made no other changes to the Nevada

Utah’s version only differed in that unlike the Nevada provision, it
did not capitalize “oath” or “affirmation.” See CC, at B9.
10
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model. The 1887 version moved further away from the Nevada model, discarding the awkward warrant clause language. See CC, at B9. The 1887 version instead tracked the language of the Fourth Amendment, requiring that
warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.” 1887 Draft Const., art. I, § 19; U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The final and current search and seizure provision, adopted at the
Constitutional Convention of 1895, represented a final repudiation of the
Nevada model, replacing “on probable cause” with the Fourth Amendment
language, “upon probable cause.” Id. As explained above, the 1895 version
is materially identical to the Fourth Amendment, making only minor stylistic changes to the Fourth Amendment language.
The framers chose to mirror the language of the Fourth Amendment,
even though they had a variety of other models to choose from. They might
have chosen to pattern the search and seizure guarantee after the more
broadly worded Washington provision, which stated that “[n]o person shall
be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority
of law.” Wash. Const. art. I, § 7 (Oct. 1, 1889); see also The Utah Example, supra, at 751, 801 & n.312. They might have specified that the probable cause
showing be made in writing or by affidavit, as required under the constitutions of Rhode Island, Illinois, Missouri, Colorado, South Dakota, Montana,
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Idaho, and Wyoming. See CC, at B4, B6, B9-10. They might have chosen to
adopt the language used by some of the original thirteen states. See CC, at
B1-4. Or, they might have added to the wording of the Fourth Amendment,
as did Nevada and other states. See, generally, CC, at B4-9. Instead, they adhered to the language of the Fourth Amendment.
In sum, the evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision—from a
single reasonableness clause (fashioned in the language of our first two
states), to the Nevada model (with its unique wording), to the near replica
of the Fourth Amendment—suggests that Utah’s framers were satisfied
with the protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment and intended
to secure for Utahns those same protections. Indeed, given the evolving history of Utah’s provision, which culminated in the adoption of a provision
mirroring the Fourth Amendment, “it is difficult to argue that the Utah provision should be more broadly interpreted.” Antipolygamy Raids, supra, at 5.
3. The action taken by Utah’s framers at the 1895 Convention, together with their debates and statements, suggest
that they intended to provide protections that mirrored
the Fourth Amendment.
The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1895 also offer
important clues regarding the framers’ intent. On the fifteenth day of the
Convention, Heber M. Wells submitted the report of the Committee on the
Preamble and Declaration of Rights (“Rights Committee”). 1 Official Report

-23-

of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt Lake City on
the Fourth Day of March, 1895, to Adopt a Constitution for the State of Utah 200
(Salt Lake City, Star Printing Co. 1898) [hereinafter “Proceedings”]. Two days
later, the Convention began its consideration of the proposed declaration of
rights. Proceedings, at 228-29. On the twenty-second day, “Section 14 was
read and passed without amendment” or discussion. Id. at 319.
Although the delegates were silent regarding Section 14, the actions
taken by the delegates, and their statements and debates, offer significant
insight into their intent as to Section 14. Of most significance was a written
address to the people of Utah recommending ratification, which declared
that “[t]he inspiration behind the declaration of rights came from the great
parent bill of rights framed by the fathers of our country.” 2 Proceedings
1847. The framers thus viewed the Bill of Rights as the starting point, or
foundation, upon which the declaration of rights was built. That said, they
also understood that they were not obligated to provide protections identical to the Bill of Rights. Thus, Dennis Clay Eichnor, a member of the Rights
Committee, stated that he “consulted [all] forty-four state constitutions, in
preparing [the] declaration of rights. Id. at 102.
An examination of the declaration of rights, as adopted by the Convention, reveals that the framers generally retained the fundamental guar-
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antees of the Bill of Rights. In many instances they borrowed liberally from
other state constitutions to clarify, supplement, or otherwise modify the
federal right.11 In other words, they built upon the foundation of the “great

See, e.g. Utah Const. art. I, § 1 (adding that all men have the right “to
worship according to the dictates of their consciences” and “to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of
that right”); Utah Const. art. I, § 4 (incorporating First Amendment religious
liberty clauses but adding that “[t]he rights of conscience shall never be infringed,” that “[t]here shall be no union of church and State,” that participation in elections and juries may not be conditioned on religious beliefs, and
that money may not be appropriated for religious functions or establishments); Utah Const. art. I, § 6 (specifying that the people’s right to bear arms
is “for their security and defense”); Utah Const. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting “unnecessary rigor” of prisoners in addition to prohibiting excessive bails and
fines, and cruel and unusual punishment, as found in the Eighth Amendment); Utah Const. art. I, § 10 (expounding on the right to a jury trial); Utah
Const. art. I, § 12 (adding the right to have “a copy” of the accusation, “the
right to appear and defend in person,” the right “to testify in [one’s] own
behalf,” and “the right to appeal in all cases,” providing that “the accused,
before final judgment, [could not] be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure the[se] rights,” and adding that “a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife”); Utah Const. art.
I, § 13 (permitting initiation of criminal prosecution by grand jury indictment or, unlike Fifth Amendment, “by information after an examination
and commitment by a magistrate”); Utah Const. art. I, § 15 (adding that
freedom of speech and of the press may not be restrained and setting the
parameters for defamation law); Utah Const. art. I, § 19 (defining treason
using the same terminology as U.S. Const., art. III, § 3, but unlike art. III, § 3,
not recognizing that a conviction for treason can be based on the traitor’s
confession in open court); Utah Const. art. I, § 20 (providing the same rights
of the Third Amendment regarding the quartering of soldiers, but adding a
provision that “[t]he military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power”); Utah Const. art. I, § 22 (prohibiting the taking of private property
for public use without just compensation, as in the Fifth Amendment, but
adding that private property may not be “damaged for public use without
just compensation”).
11
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parent bill of rights.” 2 Proceedings 1847. In other instances, however, the
language of other federal provisions was left unaltered (save for stylistic
changes). As discussed, the framers left unaltered the language of the
Fourth Amendment in Section 14. Compare U.S. Const. amend. IV with Utah
Const. art. I, § 14. They also left unaltered the language of the Thirteenth
Amendment, prohibiting slavery, in Section 21. Compare U.S. Const. amend.
XIII with Utah Const. art. I, § 21. Section 5, governing the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, also tracks the language of its federal counterpart, article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. Compare U.S.
Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 with Utah Const. art. I, § 5. Although the delegates
were silent as to Section 14, sections 5 and 21 generated debate.
The debates respecting these latter two provisions are particularly instructive when assessing the framers’ intent in choosing language that
tracked the language of the United States Constitution.
Section 21 (proposed as section 22) was proposed by the Rights
Committee to read:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist in this State.
1 Proceedings 326. As noted, this tracked the language of the Thirteenth
Amendment:
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Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been unduly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
U.S. Const. amend. XIII. Orson Whitney moved to amend the proposed
provision, so “that the word ‘whereof’ be stricken out and the words, ‘of
which’ be substituted.” 1 Proceedings 326. This proposal to amend was swiftly opposed:
Mr. EICHNOR. I think that this is the language of the Constitution of the United States.
Mr. WELLS: Exactly.
Mr. EICHNOR: I believe in adhering to the Constitution of the
United States when we copy it.
Mr. WHITNEY: It is a hundred years old.
1 Proceedings 326. Following this discussion, the question was taken on the
motion and “the amendment was rejected.” 1 Proceedings 326.
The debate regarding Section 5 reveals why the delegates believed in
adhering to federal constitutional language. Unlike Section 21, Section 5 was
originally proposed in language that differed from the United States Constitution:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, when in case of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety imperatively demands it.
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1 Proceedings 252 (emphasis denoting difference from U.S Const. art. I, § 9).
On objection of one of the delegates, the word “imperative” was stricken, as
it was not found in any of the other constitutions. 1 Proceedings 252. Another
delegate proposed that the provision be amended “by adding ‘in such a
manner as shall be prescribed by law.’” 1 Proceedings 252-53. But Charles
Varian opposed the amendment, asking why it “cannot . . . be safely left to
such occasions and to be exercised in accordance with the general precedent
and history of its exercise in this country.” 1 Proceedings 252-53. Others opposed the amendment on grounds that both the United States Constitution
and most state constitutions did not include such language. See 1 Proceedings 253-57. The proposed amendment was thus rejected. Delegate Evans
from Weber County then proposed that the words “demands it” be replaced
with the words, “requires it,” as provided in the United States Constitution:
I just want to say that is the exact language of the Constitution
of the United States and [“demands it”] might be considered in
a different way. The words, ‘requires it’ have a well understood meaning by the construction of the courts. Now it may
be considered differently if we use the words ‘demands it,’ because it might be that there should be some demand made upon the authorities whenever the public safety requires it. For
that reason, I think it would be better to use the usual language.
1 Proceedings 257. The question was thereafter taken upon the motion and
the amendment was adopted by the Convention, resulting in a provision
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that tracked the language of the United States Constitution. 1 Proceedings
257.
These debates thus reveal that when the framers copied language
from the United States Constitution, they did so to ensure that the provision
would not “be considered in a different way.” 1 Proceedings 257. When using
language from the United States Constitution, or other constitutions, they
did not seek to recognize rights that might be interpreted differently, but
rather to guarantee rights that were firmly established by the courts. They
sought stability and uniformity.
Another such example was the debate regarding the right of the accused “to be confronted by the witnesses against him.” Utah Const. art. I, §
12. Mr. Van Horne proposed an exception to the confrontation right, where
“evidence by deposition may be authorized by law.” 1 Proceedings 306. This
proposed amendment was met with fierce opposition on the grounds that it
represented a departure from established precedent. In opposing the
amendment, Charles Varian remarked that it “proposed to interpolate
something new here involving something that puts us all at sea; again, requiring, as of necessity it will, other judicial construction, and interpretation
. . . .” 1 Proceedings 307. Concluding his remarks, Mr. Varian then asked:
Why not leave it as it is? Why not leave it within the ancient
landmarks, so that every lawyer and every layman may know just
-29-

what this does mean? Judicial decision after decision, all in one line,
particularly have determined the meaning of this language as
the committee have reported it here. Why should we stray away
and put something in there that will tend to bring about and will
doubtless bring about this confusion and conflict in interpretation?
1 Proceedings 307-08 (emphasis added). The proposed amendment was
thereafter rejected. 1 Proceedings 308. Once again, the framers rejected language that would inject uncertainty in the right provided, in favor of language whose meaning was well established.
As noted, the framers did not engage in any such discussions regarding Section 14. But as discussed, they set as their inspiration the Bill of
Rights and did not depart from the language of that charter in drafting Section 14. Absent evidence to the contrary, therefore, this Court should presume that the Constitution’s framers, and the people who ratified it, intended that the protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment and Section
14 “be one and the same.” Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221.
C. Warrantless searches of vehicles based on probable cause
alone have been recognized as reasonable since the inception
of the nation.
In light of the foregoing presumption, this Court should depart from
Fourth Amendment precedent only “in compelling circumstances,” Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1235 (plurality opinion), e.g., relevant case law or other his-
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torical evidence at or near the time of the framing suggesting a different
understanding.
Defendant asks the Court to adopt a different interpretation based on
inconsistencies, vagaries, or changes in federal jurisprudence. Pet.Brf. 6-8.
But as explained by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Anderson,
“Utah ought not depart from federal search and seizure law in construing
article I, section 14 simply because of some inconsistency in that law.” 910
P.2d at 1239 (Stewart, J., concurring in result). But even if such were a valid
basis to depart from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, no such inconsistency or change exists here. Indeed, all the evidence of the law of search
and seizure supports the court of appeals’ conclusion that a warrantless
search of a mobile vehicle is supported by probable cause alone.
The “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was first recognized in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925)—a decision that issued just 30 years after the Utah Constitution’s
adoption. Carroll held that “the true rule is that if a search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and
destruction, the search and seizure are valid.” Id. at 149.
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In support, Carroll relied on a case that predated the Utah Constitution’s adoption by almost 10 years—Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623
(1886)—which recognized the difference between seizing evidence of criminality and contraband. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149-50. But more importantly for
purposes here, Carroll looked to the actions of the First Congress as persuasive evidence of what the Framers who adopted the Bill of Rights understood the Constitution to mean. In this vein, the Act of 1789 authorized, on
appropriate suspicion, the search and seizure of goods in transit without a
warrant:
“That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially appointed by either of them for that purpose,
shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in
which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to
search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise ....”
Id. at 150 (quoting 1 Stat. 43) (emphasis added). But the Act did not authorize the warrantless search and seizure of such goods in homes or buildings:
“[A]nd if [such a collector, naval officer, surveyor, or other specially appointed person] shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any particular dwelling, house, store, building, or
other place, they or either of them shall, upon application on oath
or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to
enter such house, store, or other place (in the daytime only) and
there to search for such goods, and if any shall be found, to
seize and secure the same for trial ....”
Id. at 150-51 (quoting 1 Stat. 43) (emphasis added).
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Drawing from the Act of 1789 and ensuing legislation, Carroll concluded “that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the
beginning of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference between
a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a
proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Id. at 153.
And turning to the circumstances when a warrantless search of a vehicle
may be made, Carroll held that “those lawfully within the country, entitled
to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official, authorized to
search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.” Id. at 154.
In sum, Carroll held that due to the mobility of a vehicle, a warrantless
search of a vehicle that is stopped on the roadway is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment if there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband. The Supreme Court has never strayed from that principle.
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In Cooper v. California, the Court held that “searches of cars that are
constantly movable may make the search of a car without a warrant a reasonable one although the result might be the opposite in a search of a home,
a store, or other fixed piece of property.” 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967). In Chambers
v. Maroney, the Court again recognized that “[i]n terms of circumstances justifying a warrantless search, the Court has long distinguished between an
automobile and a home or office.” 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970). Chambers thus reiterated that a warrant is unnecessary for the search of a vehicle because “the
car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never
be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” Id. at 51. In Cardwell v. Lewis,
the Court recognized that the underlying factor for the automobile exception “has been the exigent circumstances that exist in connection with movable vehicles,” i.e., “the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable.’ ” 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) (quoting Chambers, 399 U.S. at 50-51).
In United States v. Ross, the Court reiterated Carroll’s conclusion that warrantless vehicle searches based on probable cause are reasonable “[g]iven
the nature of an automobile in transit.” 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 (1982). And in
California v. Carney, the Court again observed that its cases “have consistently recognized ready mobility as one of the principal bases of the automobile
exception.” 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985).
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Notwithstanding these clear pronouncements, some lower courts began to read the Supreme Court’s cases as requiring additional exigency,
apart from an automobile’s mobility. But in two per curiam decisions, the
Supreme Court reiterated that it has never required exigency beyond the
ready mobility of a vehicle. In Pennsylvania v. Labron, the Court held that
lower court decisions holding otherwise were based “on an incorrect reading of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” 518 U.S. 938, 938-39 (1996) (per curiam). Labron emphasized
that the automobile exception has from its inception been “based on the automobile’s ready mobility,’ an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain
a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear.” Id. at
940. And three years later in Maryland v. Dyson, the Court again held that
“under [its] established precedent” since Carroll, “the ‘automobile exception’ has no separate exigency requirement.” 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999) (per
curiam).12

Some cases have recognized that warrantless automobile searches
based on probable cause are also justified “ ‘because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating
to one’s home or office.’ ” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985) (citation omitted). But that fact does not detract from the original reason identified by the Court for upholding warrantless automobile searches.
12
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The plurality in Anderson saw it no differently, holding that “exigent
circumstances exist when ‘the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and
the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.’ ” 910 P.2d at 1237 (plurality opinion) (quoting Chambers, 399 U.S. at
51).
Defendant argues that the ability of officers to apply for a warrant
electronically changes the calculus. Pet.Brf. 9-10. Not so. Seizing a car to
await a warrant requires the same probable cause and exigency required to
search the car. As explained in Chambers, there is “no constitutional difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting
the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out
an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable.” 399 U.S. at 51-52. The Court in Ross explained
that permitting either course of action is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—“based on the practicalities of the situations presented and a
realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a contrary rule
would provide for privacy interests.” 456 U.S. at 807 n.9.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
State v. Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, 369 P.3d 127

2016 UT App 42

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
ZACHARY RIGBY,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20140553-CA
Filed March 3, 2016
First District Court, Logan Department
The Honorable Brian G. Cannell
No. 135100370
Brandon J. Smith, Attorney for Appellant
James Swink and Aaron M. Jossie, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE
GREGORY K. ORME and SENIOR JUDGE JAMES Z. DAVIS concurred. 1
ROTH, Judge:
¶1
Zachary Rigby appeals his conviction for driving with a
measurable controlled substance in the body and possession or
use of a controlled substance, both class B misdemeanors. Rigby
challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence that the police found during a warrantless search of his
vehicle. Rigby contends that the Utah Constitution provides its

1. Senior Judge James Z. Davis began his work on this case as a
member of the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired from the court,
but thereafter became a Senior Judge. He completed his work on
this case sitting by special assignment as authorized by law. See
generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6).

State v. Rigby
citizens greater protection against unreasonable searches than
the United States Constitution because Utah courts have
required police officers to have both probable cause and exigent
circumstances when performing a warrantless search under the
automobile exception. He concedes the officers had probable
cause to search his automobile following the traffic stop but
asserts that they violated his constitutional rights by conducting
the search without a warrant in the absence of exigent
circumstances. Because we are reluctant to diverge from our
supreme court’s historical pattern of paralleling federal search
and seizure law, we conclude that law enforcement officers were
only required to have probable cause to justify the search of
Rigby’s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
¶2
Ordinarily, ‚*w+e recite the facts in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s findings from the suppression
hearing.‛ State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v.
Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). But for purposes
of Rigby’s motion to suppress and, by extension, this appeal,
both parties have stipulated to the facts as presented in the
original police report. ‚A stipulation of fact filed with and
accepted by a court . . . is conclusive of all matters necessarily
included in the stipulation.‛ Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah
State Tax Comm’n, 2001 UT 11, ¶ 20, 20 P.3d 287 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Prinsburg State Bank v.
Abundo, 2012 UT 94, ¶ 14, 296 P.3d 709 (‚*W]hen a court adopts a
stipulation of the parties, the issues to which the parties have
stipulated become settled . . . .‛ (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). Therefore, we recite the facts in accordance
with the parties’ stipulation.
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¶3
On March 28, 2013, a police officer pulled Rigby’s
automobile over for a stop sign violation. Upon approaching the
vehicle, the police officer could ‚*i+immediately . . . detect[] the
odor of both burnt and fresh marijuana coming from the
vehicle.‛ Rigby and the two other occupants were ‚exhibiting
physical indicators of recent marijuana use, including bloodshot
eyes, droopy eyelids and a stoned look,‛ along with acting
‚extremely nervous‛ during the traffic stop. Additional officers,
including a K9 officer, were called to the location. The officer
who initiated the traffic stop then ‚explained *to Rigby+ that *he+
was going to be searching the vehicle, not only based on the fact
that [he] could smell the marijuana in the vehicle but because the
drug dog had given a positive indication as well.‛ Two officers
then searched Rigby’s vehicle; they recovered a small metal pipe
with marijuana residue and plastic bags containing fresh
marijuana. Rigby was arrested and charged with possession of
drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; driving with a
measurable controlled substance in the body and possession or
use of a controlled substance, both class B misdemeanors; and
failure to stop at a stop sign, a class C misdemeanor.
¶4
Rigby filed a motion to suppress ‚*a+ll evidence seized
and any statement obtained‛ ‚as a result of the unlawful
searches‛ conducted ‚in violation of the Utah Constitution.‛ At
the evidentiary hearing on Rigby’s motion, he conceded that the
‚odor of marijuana was sufficient‛ to establish probable cause
but argued that exigent circumstances were also ‚required in
order to justify a warrantless search‛ under the automobile
exception. The trial court denied Rigby’s motion to suppress,
finding that ‚the search was reasonable under the circumstances
and such evidence was lawfully obtained under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement.‛
¶5
Rigby subsequently pled guilty to one count of driving
with a measurable controlled substance in the body, see Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6a-517(2) (LexisNexis 2014), and one count of
possession or use of a controlled substance, see id. § 58-37-
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8(2)(a)(i).2 In entering his pleas, Rigby reserved the right to
appeal the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion. See State
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (describing how a
conditional plea ‚specifically preserves the suppression issue for
appeal and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant’s
arguments in favor of suppression are accepted by the appellate
court‛) (citations omitted).

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6
On appeal, Rigby argues that although the United States
Constitution and the Utah Constitution contain nearly
identically phrased protections against unreasonable searches,
the Utah Constitution provides greater protection to its citizens
by requiring law enforcement officers to have both probable
cause and exigent circumstances before conducting a warrantless
search under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, even though the United States Supreme Court has
held that under the federal constitution the automobile exception
requires only probable cause. ‚Matters of constitutional
interpretation are questions of law that we review for
correctness, and we provide no deference to the district court’s
legal conclusions.‛ State v. Gonzalez-Camargo, 2012 UT App 366,
¶ 15, 293 P.3d 1121 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶ 27, 344 P.3d 581
(‛Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law that we review
for correctness . . . .‛ (first omission in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).

2. Because the statutory provisions in effect at the relevant times
do not differ materially from the statutory provisions now in
effect, we cite the current version of the Utah Code for
convenience.
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ANALYSIS
¶7
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution contain nearly identical provisions safeguarding an
individual’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures.3
Both protect ‚*t+he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures‛ by the government. U.S. Const. amend.
IV; see also Utah Const. art. I, § 14. Some time ago, the Utah
Supreme Court observed that ‚Article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution reads nearly verbatim with the fourth amendment,
and thus [the] Court has never drawn any distinctions between
the protections afforded by the respective constitutional
provisions. Rather, the Court has always considered the
protections afforded to be one and the same.‛ State v. Watts, 750
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). The question presented here is
whether Utah courts should continue to follow this principle and
track the relatively recent evolution of the automobile exception
under federal law or chart its own path under the Utah
Constitution. To address this question, we first trace the history
of the automobile exception under both federal and state case
law. Next we examine the status of the automobile exception
under federal law in light of the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per
curiam). Finally, we consider whether Utah is likely to continue
to track federal law after Labron with regard to the automobile
exception or chart a new path under the Utah Constitution.

3. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
(continued<)
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I. The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement
¶8
Because warrantless searches are ‚per se unreasonable,‛
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), ‚*p]olice officers
generally need a warrant to search a place in which a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy,‛ State v. Boyles, 2015 UT
App 185, ¶ 10, 356 P.3d 687 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154, 164 (1978)); see also id. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 164) (noting
that ‚*b+efore issuing a search warrant, a magistrate must
determine that probable cause exists to conduct the search‛).
‚There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule . . . one [of
which] is the so-called ‘automobile exception’ . . . .‛ California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). Historically, under the
automobile exception, police were permitted to search an
automobile without a warrant so long as both probable cause
and exigent circumstances existed. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 48–51 (1970); State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah
1978).

(<continued)
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Utah Constitution is phrased very
similarly:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Const. art. I, § 14.
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A.

The Automobile Exception Under Federal Case Law

¶9
In 1925, the United States Supreme Court decided Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the seminal case addressing
the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement. In Carroll, the Court determined that while an
individual has a constitutionally protected privacy interest in an
automobile, the degree of protection is lessened ‚because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.‛ Id. at 153. This mobility
principle has continued to be a factor in the Supreme Court’s
approach to automobile search cases since Carroll. See, e.g.,
Labron, 518 U.S. at 940; New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112–13
(1986); Carney, 471 U.S. at 392–93; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 367 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588–89 (1974);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441–42 (1973); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459–60 (1971); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52;
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967).
¶10 The Court has recognized, however, that ‚ready mobility
is not the only basis for the *automobile+ exception.‛ Carney, 471
U.S. at 391. Rather, the exception is also justified because of the
‚reduced expectations of privacy‛ arising from the ‚pervasive
regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public
highways.‛ Id. at 392 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 440–41); see also
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009) (recognizing that ‚a
motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than
in his home‛); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303–07 (1999)
(holding that both drivers and passengers have a reduced
expectation of privacy in an automobile); Class, 475 U.S. at 113
(‚*A+utomobiles are justifiably the subject of pervasive
regulation by the State.‛); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
12–13 (1977) (‚One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor
vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom
serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal
effects.‛) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590.
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¶11 Historically, the automobile exception has required two
circumstances. First, there must be probable cause for a search.
See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 48 (‚*A+utomobiles . . . may be searched
without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the
search without a warrant of a house or an office, provided that
there is probable cause . . . .‛). And second, there must be exigent
circumstances. See id. at 50–51 (‚But the circumstances that
furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for particular
articles are most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity
to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable. . . . Only in
exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to
probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.‛).
The required exigency was usually found to inhere in a factor
fundamental to the exception itself, i.e., the characteristic
mobility of an automobile. See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569
(citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158–59) (stating that ‚a warrantless
search of an automobile, based upon probable cause to believe
that the vehicle contained evidence of crime in light of an
exigency arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle,
[does] not contravene the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment‛).
¶12 In 1996, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the
warrantless search of an automobile no longer required separate
consideration of exigent circumstances, so long as there was
probable cause for the search. Labron, 518 U.S. at 940. The Court
held that ‚ready mobility [was] exigency sufficient to excuse
failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct
the search is clear.‛ Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 390–91). In
reaching this conclusion the Court reasoned that in addition to
the mobility principle, its prior recognition of the ‚reduced
expectation of privacy in an automobile‛ justified recasting the
description of the automobile exception to permit a warrantless
search ‚*i+f a car is readily mobile and probable cause
exists . . . without *anything+ more.‛ Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at
393).
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B.

The Automobile Exception Under Utah Case Law

¶13 Historically, Utah case law has mirrored federal case law
with respect to the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. Utah cases, like their federal counterparts, have
recognized that ‚*w+arrantless searches are per se unreasonable
unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement.‛ State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah
1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Our
case law has also echoed federal case law in recognizing that
‚*t+here are . . . several exceptions to the warrant requirement . . .
includ[ing] . . . [the] search of an automobile based on probable
cause.‛ State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (citing
Chambers, 399 U.S. 42); see also State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144–45
(Utah 1978) (discussing the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement and quoting Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51, with
approval).
¶14 Our cases have also described the rationale for the
automobile exception much like federal cases have. For example,
in the 1948 case City of Price v. Jaynes, while discussing the
validity of a city ordinance modeled after the Fourth
Amendment, our supreme court recognized that under federal
law an individual has a lessened degree of protection in some
instances based on whether the place to be searched is mobile.
191 P.2d 606, 608 (Utah 1948). And in City of Price the Utah
Supreme Court enunciated and followed the principles first
announced in Carroll:
[The Fourth Amendment] has been construed
practically since the beginning of the Government,
as recognizing a necessary difference between a
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure
in respect of which a proper official warrant
readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship,
motor boat, wagon or automobile for contraband
goods where it is not practicable to serve a warrant
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because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the jurisdiction in which the warrant is sought.
Id. at 608 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153); see also State v. Dorsey,
731 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, (‚It
has long been held that warrantless vehicle searches are not
invalid under the Fourth Amendment if probable cause for a
search exists.‛)). And subsequent to City of Price, the court has
repeatedly referred to the mobility principle as justification for
the automobile exception. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18,
¶ 11, 229 P.3d 650; State v. James, 2000 UT 80, ¶ 10, 13 P.3d 576;
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1234–37 (Utah 1996) (plurality
opinion); Limb, 581 P.2d at 144–45; State v. Farnsworth, 519 P.2d
244, 247 (Utah 1974); State v. Shields, 503 P.2d 848, 849 (Utah
1972).
¶15 Further, like the federal courts, our supreme court has
recognized that in addition to an automobile’s ready mobility,
the automobile exception finds support in reduced privacy
expectations. For instance, in State v. Baker, the Utah Supreme
Court noted that the ‚automobile exception to the warrant rule
arises because occupants of a vehicle have a lesser expectation of
privacy due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly
regulated status.‛ 2010 UT 18, ¶ 11 (alteration, citation, and
internal quotation marks omitted); accord James, 2000 UT 80, ¶ 10
(‚Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated
status, persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of
privacy than they would have within a private dwelling.‛); see
also State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131–34 (Utah 1994); State v.
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989).
¶16 And like the federal courts until Labron, the Utah Supreme
Court has historically described the automobile exception as
requiring both probable cause and exigent circumstances to
justify a police officer in the warrantless search of an automobile.
See, e.g., State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984) (‚For
[the automobile] exception to apply, the police must have
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probable cause to believe that the automobile contains either
contraband or evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if
not immediately seized.‛); see also State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,
470 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (approving the logic of
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, and re-iterating the requirement that
police officers have both probable cause and exigent
circumstances to justify a search under the automobile
exception); Limb, 581 P.2d at 144 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, with
approval and holding that probable cause and exigent
circumstances existed to justify a warrantless search of an
automobile). Also in line with the federal approach, the Utah
Supreme Court has recognized that the required exigency
generally arises from the inherent mobility of an automobile. See
Shields, 503 P.2d at 849 (‚In exigent circumstances, the judgment
of a police officer as to probable cause will serve as sufficient
authorization for a search, i.e., a search warrant is unnecessary
where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped
on the highway, for the car is movable, . . . and the car’s contents
may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.‛).
II. The Automobile Exception Under Pennsylvania v. Labron
¶17 On July 1, 1996, the United States Supreme Court decided
the companion cases of Pennsylvania v. Kilgore and Pennsylvania
v. Labron in a consolidated opinion. See Pennsylvania v. Labron,
518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per curiam). In both cases, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had held that the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution required law enforcement officers to
obtain a warrant before searching a vehicle unless both probable
cause and exigent circumstances were present. Id. at 938–39. In
particular, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that the
warrantless search of Labron’s vehicle was unjustified because
although law enforcement officers had probable cause to search
the trunk of the vehicle for suspected drug activity, there were
no exigent circumstances justifying the search because ‚the
police had time to secure a warrant.‛ Id. at 939–40. In a relatively
short per curiam decision, the Supreme Court concluded that it
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was incorrect under the Fourth Amendment for courts to require
law enforcement officers to have both probable cause and exigent
circumstances for the warrantless search of an automobile. Id.
The Court began its analysis with a brief review of the history of
the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception. Id. (first citing
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1985); then citing
Carroll, 267 U.S. 132). The Court noted that the first cases
underlying the automobile exception ‚were based on the
automobile’s ‘ready mobility’‛ because ‚‘ready mobility[]’ *is+ an
exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant
once probable cause to conduct the search is clear.‛ Id. But the
Court explained that ‚*m+ore recent cases provide a further
justification [for the automobile exception+‛ based on an
‚individual’s reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile[]
[because of] . . . its pervasive regulation.‛ Id. (citing Carney, 471
U.S. at 391–92). The Court concluded, ‚If a car is readily mobile
and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the
Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle
without more.‛ Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 393). The Court has
subsequently stated that Labron stands for the rule that under
federal law, ‚the ‘automobile exception’ has no separate
exigency requirement.‛ Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466–67
(1999) (per curiam) (discussing Labron, 518 U.S. 938).4

4. In Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999) (per curiam), the
Supreme Court stated that it had been ‚clear‛ since United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), that the automobile exception had no
exigency requirement and characterized Labron as simply
reiterating that principle:
The Fourth Amendment generally requires police
to secure a warrant before conducting a search.
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1985). As
we recognized nearly 75 years ago in Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), there is an
exception to this requirement for searches of
(continued<)
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III. The Automobile Exception Under Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution
¶18 The Utah Supreme Court has not specifically considered
the effect of Labron on Utah law. And though we have

(<continued)
vehicles. And under our established precedent, the
‚automobile exception‛ has no separate exigency
requirement. We made this clear in United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982), when we said that in
cases where there was probable cause to search a
vehicle ‚a search is not unreasonable if based on
facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant,
even though a warrant has not been actually obtained.‛
In a case with virtually identical facts to this one
(even down to the bag of cocaine in the trunk of the
car), Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per
curiam), we repeated that the automobile exception
does not have a separate exigency requirement:
‚If a car is readily mobile and probable cause
exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth
Amendment . . . permits police to search the
vehicle without more.‛ Id. at 940.
Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466–67 (emphasis in original). But Labron itself
did not mention Ross and seemed at the time to mark a point of
departure from the exigency requirement. Certainly, the
conclusion Dyson draws from Ross seems more apparent in
Labron’s clarifying light than it may have been before then. It is
tempting to surmise that Labron’s per curiam nature may have
signaled that the Court did not consider its decision to be so
much a departure from the past as an acknowledgement that,
given its foundation in the mobility principle, the exigency
requirement may already have largely lost its role as an
independent component of the automobile exception.

20140553-CA

13

2016 UT App 42

State v. Rigby
mentioned Labron on occasion, this court has not had the
opportunity to specifically analyze Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution in light of that decision. In fact, each of the
few times this court has cited Labron, we did so to support a
conclusion—in the context of analyzing federal law—that a law
enforcement officer’s search of an appellant’s automobile was
justified under the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement because the officer had
probable cause. See State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ¶¶ 14, 16,
173 P.3d 213 (recognizing that the requirements to justify a
search under the automobile exception have ‚fluctuated in the
past,‛ but ultimately relying on both Dyson and Labron to
conclude that ‚federal law ha*d+ been clarified‛ and therefore
‚*t+he officers’ search . . . was justified under the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment[] . . . because the officers
had probable cause‛); State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, ¶¶ 6–8,
141 P.3d 602 (relying on Dyson and Labron to conclude that
because the defendant’s vehicle was mobile the officer needed
only probable cause to search the vehicle under the Fourth
Amendment); State v. Mehew, 2003 UT App 166U, para. 3 (citing
Labron, 518 U.S. at 940) (holding that because the defendant’s
vehicle was mobile and probable cause existed the warrantless
search of the vehicle was valid under the automobile exception).
Further, although not specifically citing Labron, we have applied
the rule Labron recognized—that the automobile exception,
under federal law, has no separate exigency requirement—on a
number of occasions. See, e.g., State v. Juma, 2012 UT App 27, ¶ 9,
270 P.3d 564; State v. Butler, 2011 UT App 281, ¶ 12, 263 P.3d 463;
In re D.A.B., 2009 UT App 169, ¶ 7, 214 P.3d 878; State v. Griffith,
2006 UT App 291, ¶ 6, 141 P.3d 602. And it appears that the only
time we have been asked to consider whether Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution would yield a more restrictive
interpretation of the automobile exception than Labron, we
declined to do so because the state constitutional issues were
inadequately briefed. See Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ¶ 12
(explaining that the ‚[d]efendant mentioned both the Utah and
United States Constitutions in his opening brief,‛ but ‚did not
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conduct a separate analysis of the protections afforded by each‛
and, as a consequence, this court ‚refrained from engaging in *a+
state constitutional analysis‛ of the automobile exception and
affirmed the district court based on Labron’s holding that the
Fourth Amendment required only probable cause for the
warrantless search of an automobile).
¶19 Here, Rigby acknowledges that both ‚the U.S.
Constitution and the Utah Constitution contain almost identical
protections against unreasonable searches‛ and that ‚in 1996 the
U.S. Supreme Court [in Labron] changed the requirements under
the U.S. Constitution to require probabl*e+ cause only,‛ no
longer requiring a separate showing of exigency. Rigby argues,
however, that ‚*n+o such decision has been issued regarding the
status of the Utah Constitution.‛ And therefore, according to
Rigby, ‚under the Utah Constitution an officer must still have
both probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify the
warrantless search of an automobile.‛ Unlike the appellant in
Despain, we believe that Rigby analyzes the issue in a manner
sufficient to warrant our consideration of whether, in light of
Labron, the Utah Constitution now provides its citizens greater
protection against unreasonable searches than the United States
Constitution by continuing to require that police officers have
both probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify a
warrantless search under the automobile exception. Rigby
primarily draws support for his argument that Utah ought to
depart from the federal path with regard to the automobile
exception from three opinions, which seem to be the Utah
Supreme Court’s last ventures into the realm of the Utah
Constitution’s relationship to the automobile exception prior to
Labron: State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion), and State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) (plurality opinion). We
address each case in order to determine whether our supreme
court has established a discernible distinction between the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution that may apply here.
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A.

State v. Watts

¶20 In State v. Watts a majority of the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the appellant’s conviction for unlawful production and
possession of marijuana. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1225. The appellant
in Watts had unsuccessfully moved the trial court to suppress
evidence based upon the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. Id. at 1220. While ultimately holding that private
searches did not fall within the protection of the Utah
Constitution, the Watts court acknowledged and affirmed its
historical pattern of interpreting both the federal and the state
constitutions as providing identical protections:
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution reads
nearly verbatim with the fourth amendment, and
thus this Court has never drawn any distinctions
between the protections afforded by the respective
constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court has
always considered the protections afforded to be
one and the same. We do not depart from that view
in this case, and hold that unreasonable private
searches are not subject to the protection of article
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Id. at 1221 (footnotes omitted).
¶21 Although Rigby acknowledges the court’s reasoning, he
points to a footnote in Watts in which the court opined that
‚choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for
insulating this state’s citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal
courts.‛ Id. at 1221 n.8. Rigby interprets this footnote as
indicating that ‚*t+he Watts court reserved the right to
distinguish between the protections afforded by the two
Constitutions.‛ But the footnote’s indication of the court’s
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willingness to consider a different direction at some point in the
future must be considered in light of the majority’s unequivocal
decision not to ‚depart . . . from *the court’s+ consistent
refusal . . . to interpret article I, section 14 of [the Utah]
constitution in a manner different from the fourth amendment to
the federal constitution.‛ Id. Therefore, the supreme court’s
statement in Watts reinforces Utah’s historical pattern of tracking
federal law in this area both in principle and in practice while
keeping open the possibility of departing from that pattern,
should the circumstances undergirding it change in some
significant way. Cf. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 11, 164 P.3d
397 (‚In cases involving Fourth Amendment questions under the
United States Constitution, we review mixed questions of law
and fact under a correctness standard in the interest of creating
uniform legal rules for law enforcement.‛ (emphasis added)).
B.

State v. Larocco

¶22 In State v. Larocco a plurality of the supreme court (two
justices concurring and one concurring only in the result) urged
departure from continued reliance on federal jurisprudence as
the basis for interpreting Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470–71. The plurality reasoned
that although both federal and Utah courts had historically
interpreted the automobile exception to require both probable
cause and exigent circumstances, id. at 470, exigency had become
essentially a given based on a too-simplistic notion about the
ready mobility of automobiles, id. at 469. The Larocco plurality
thus concluded that an automobile’s mere potential for mobility
ought no longer to be sufficient to satisfy the exigency
requirement under the Utah Constitution. Rather, a two-step
process was required: first, it should be established that officers
had probable cause for a search; then in order to meet the
required level of exigency, ‚*t+he next step requires justification
of the warrantless search by showing either that the
procurement of a warrant would have jeopardized the safety of
the police officers or that the evidence was likely to have been
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lost or destroyed.‛ Id. at 470. In other words, for the automobile
exception to apply, the State must go beyond the general concept
of ready mobility and show exigency particularized to the actual
circumstances at hand. Thus, in Larocco, there was probable
cause for a search, but the State failed to show that the
presumably stolen automobile, while operable and likely mobile,
would no longer have been available to search if the officers had
taken the time to obtain a warrant. As a result, the warrantless
search was not justified. Id. at 470–71.
¶23 But Larocco’s plurality status ‚represents the view of only
two justices . . . and is therefore not the law of this state.‛
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1234 n.5. Accordingly, the holding from
Watts remained ‚the law of this state.‛ See id.; see also State v.
Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (‚Because Larocco
was only a plurality opinion, its analysis is not binding.‛).
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the plurality decision in
Larocco signals our supreme court’s intent to interpret the state
constitution to provide different protections than the federal
constitution. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 996 n.3 (noting that
‚a plurality opinion . . . does not establish precedent‛). A
subsequent plurality decision, State v. Anderson, underscores this
notion.
C.

State v. Anderson

¶24 In State v. Anderson, issued just months before Labron,5 the
Utah Supreme Court was again asked to depart from its practice
of interpreting in tandem the search and seizure requirements of
the state and federal constitutions in the context of the
automobile exception. See Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1235. But the
Anderson plurality rejected the approach taken by the Larocco

5. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), was issued on
February 2, 1996, while Labron, 518 U.S. 938, was issued
approximately five months later, on July 1, 1996.

20140553-CA

18

2016 UT App 42

State v. Rigby
plurality and affirmed that Utah would continue to track the
federal path in this area: ‚Because this portion of Larocco
coincides with federal law, we agree with those who joined the
Larocco plurality that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
requires that warrantless searches of automobiles be justified by
a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances.‛ Id. at
1237. Based on this statement, Rigby urges us to acknowledge
Anderson as the irrefutable last word on the issue. In other
words, Rigby argues that even if Larocco’s more restrictive
plurality approach is not binding, we should conclude at a
minimum that the Anderson plurality has accurately articulated
Utah law just prior to Labron as holding that probable cause
alone is not sufficient to justify the warrantless search of an
automobile but that exigent circumstances are also required.
Rigby contends that the Anderson court ‚went into great detail to
explain that under both the Federal and Utah constitutions the
warrantless search of an automobile required ‘both probable
cause and exigent circumstances.’‛ (Quoting Anderson, 910 P.2d
at 1236.)
¶25 While that is true, Anderson does not support Rigby’s
position as strongly as he contends, because Rigby does not
acknowledge the context in which that explanation occurred.
Although the Anderson plurality recognized that in the past,
federal Fourth Amendment law had been ‚the source of much
confusion among judges, lawyers, and police,‛ it went on to
explain that our supreme court ‚ha*s+ endeavored toward
uniformity in the application of the search and seizure
requirements of the state and federal constitutions, particularly
since the respective provisions are practically identical,‛
cautioning that ‚*a+n opposite approach could lead to
unfavorable results.‛ Id. at 1235–36 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). In accordance with this principle,
recognizing that at the time Anderson was issued, federal law
‚require*d+ that such a search be premised on probable cause
and exigent circumstances,‛ id. at 1237, the plurality concluded
that the Utah Constitution required the same: ‚*T+he Utah
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Constitution requires that warrantless searches of automobiles
be justified by a showing of probable cause and exigent
circumstances,‛ id. Thus, rather than fixing the combination of
probable cause and exigent circumstances as the invariable
components of the automobile exception under the Utah
Constitution, Anderson can be read to express the plurality’s
view that the Utah Supreme Court had expressed a distinct and
continuing preference to have Article 1, Section 14 interpreted
consistently with the Fourth Amendment in order to avoid the
‚unfavorable results‛ that a different approach ‚could lead to.‛
Id. at 1235 (‚For these reasons, Utah courts should construe
article I, section 14 in a manner similar to constructions of the
Fourth amendment except in compelling circumstances.‛ (citing,
among other cases, Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 & n.8)).
D.

The Current State of the Automobile Exception Under
Utah Law

¶26 The plurality decisions in Larocco and Anderson present
two competing approaches. On the one hand, the Larocco
plurality analyzes the automobile exception to require a
complex, policy-based analysis giving due consideration to the
principle that the Utah Constitution ought to be independently
analyzed with the potential for affording Utah citizens greater
liberties than the federal. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469–71. On the
other hand, the Anderson plurality firmly rejects that approach
and urges that the court instead adhere to the historical pattern
of following the path of federal law to avoid confusion and
‚unfavorable results.‛ Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1234–37. But
although the pluralities in Larocco and Anderson began an
internal dialogue that could eventually lead to changes in Utah’s
approach, we are effectively left with Watts as the supreme
court’s last majority expression, and therefore what appears to
be the court’s last word on the automobile exception. And while
Watts held that the automobile exception required both probable
cause and exigent circumstances, its reasoning was firmly based
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on the principle of tracking the path set by the United States
Supreme Court. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1220–21 & n.8.
¶27 Certainly, Rigby’s contention that Utah courts ought now
to depart from the federal interpretive path and determine that
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides Utah
citizens with more expansive rights than those guaranteed under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution finds
resonance in the language of some prior cases. See State v. Brake,
2004 UT 95, ¶ 16 n.2, 103 P.3d 699 (first citing Anderson, 910 P.2d
at 1234–37; and then citing Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469–70) (declining
‚the implicit invitation‛ inherent in the circumstances of the case
‚to revisit the dormant but unresolved debate in this court over
the merits of whether and when to depart from federal Fourth
Amendment doctrine and chart our own course in the realm of
search and seizure law based on the protections afforded by
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution‛); State v. DeBooy,
2000 UT 32, ¶ 12, 996 P.2d 546 (‚While this court’s interpretation
of article I, section 14 has often paralleled the United States
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we
have stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah
Constitution a different construction where doing so will more
appropriately protect the rights of this state’s citizens.‛); Larocco,
794 P.2d at 465 (‚*W+e have by no means ruled out the
possibility of [drawing distinctions between the protections
afforded by article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution].‛ (quoting
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8)); Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8 (‚In
declining to depart in this case from our consistent refusal
heretofore to interpret article I, section 14 of our constitution in a
manner different from the fourth amendment to the federal
constitution, we have by no means ruled out the possibility of
doing so in some future case. Indeed, choosing to give the Utah
Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove to be
an appropriate method for insulating this state’s citizens from
the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth
amendment by the federal courts.‛). But the decades-long
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pattern of Utah decisions following the lead of federal law in this
area before Larocco and Anderson—a pattern acknowledged and
applied in Watts—is established enough that the burden must be
on the challenging party to persuade us that a change is
justifiable, and Rigby has not carried that burden here. Rather,
the strength of that pattern and the very intensity of the
disagreement between the Larocco and Anderson pluralities deter
us from concluding that the current court would mark Labron as
Utah’s point of departure from the path of federal law on the
automobile exception.
¶28

And even were we tempted to do so,
as an intermediate court of appeals, we would be
reluctant, in any event, to become overly creative
in fashioning a state constitutional rule different
from the federal rule. Such a task lies more
appropriately with the Utah Supreme Court as ‚the
ultimate and final arbiter of the meaning of the
provisions in the Utah Declaration of Rights and
the primary protector of individual liberties.‛

State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (first
quoting Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1240 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
result); then citing State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 95 n.7 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) (stating that any departure from Fourth Amendment
case law ‚should be announced by our state’s supreme court, not
this court‛), rev’d on other grounds, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)); cf.
DIRECTV v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2015 UT 93, ¶¶ 44–46
(declining to ‚embark on a constitutional*+ . . . journey‛ when
asked to extend federal dormant commerce clause precedent
because the United States Supreme Court’s current approach
does not seem to point in that direction and because it is not the
province of the Utah Supreme Court to embark on that journey).
Accordingly, we decline to depart from the path of federal law
and conclude that under the automobile exception, as
interpreted in Labron, the law enforcement officers in this case
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were only required to have probable cause to justify the search
of Rigby’s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement of either the federal or Utah constitutions. See State
v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ¶¶ 13–16, 173 P.3d 213. Because
there is no dispute that the officers here had probable cause for a
search, the trial court did not err in denying Rigby’s motion to
suppress.6

CONCLUSION
¶29 For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.

6. Because we follow Labron’s lead and conclude that no separate
showing of exigent circumstances is required under the
automobile exception, we do not reach Rigby’s argument that
the availability of warrants by telephone or other electronic
media means that there was no exigency here as a matter of law.
Cf. State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, ¶ 60, 156 P.3d 771 (‚*P+ractical
considerations associated with warrant acquisition remain
central to inquiries into whether exigent circumstances justify a
warrantless search.‛); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah
1990) (plurality opinion) (recognizing ‚*t+he amount of time
necessary to obtain a warrant‛ is a factor used to ‚determin*e+
whether circumstances are exigent‛); City of Orem v. Henrie, 868
P.2d 1384, 1391–92 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (identifying ‚the
availability of a telephonic warrant‛ as one consideration when
determining whether exigency exists).
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State-by-State Constitution Comparison Chart

State-by-State Comparison Chart
U.S. Const. amend IV

1

DE
Dec. 7, 1787

Del. Const. art. I, § 6
(Dec. 2, 1831)

Addendum B
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
things, shall issue without describing them as particularly as
may be, nor then, unless there be probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='DE'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895 1

2

PA
Dec. 12, 1787

Penn. Const. art. I, § 8
(Jan. 1, 1874)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or
things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may
be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='PA'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

3

NJ
Dec. 18, 1787

N.J. Const. art. I, § 6
(Aug. 13, 1844)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
papers and things to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='NJ'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251
,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

1

This Addendum sets forth the search and seizure provisions of the various states as of 1895.
The date below the State represents its admission date. The date below the state constitutional provision
represents the version of that constitution. Sources are generally from governmental, historical, or
educational websites, including the NBER/University of Maryland State Constitutions Project, “a portal
to the texts of the state constitutions of the United States.” See www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu.

B1

State-by-State Comparison Chart
4

GA
Jan. 2, 1788

Geo. Const. § 1, par.
XVI (1877)
(as ratified without
subsequent
amendments)

Addendum B
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause, supported by oath, or
affirmation, particularly describing the place, or places, to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

http://www.cviog.uga.edu/Projects/gainfo/con1877b.htm (University of Georgia—Carl Vinson Institute of Government)

5

CN
Jan. 9, 1788

Conn. Const. art. I, § 8
(Oct. 12, 1818)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures, and
no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may
be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='CT'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

6

MA
Feb. 6, 1788

Mass. Const. Part the
First, art. XIV (1780)

Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches, and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers,
and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary
to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not
previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to
seize their property, be not accompanied with a special
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or
seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and
with the formalities, prescribed by the laws.

http://www.founding.com/library/lbody.cfm?id=478&parent=475

7

MD
Apr. 28, 1788

Mary. Const. Dec. Rts.
art. 26
(Aug. 17, 1867)

That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search
suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are
grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search
suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons,
without naming or describing the place, or the person in
special, are illegal, an ought not to be granted. [Note: The
Declaration of Rights to the 1867 Constitution includes 45
"articles," and no sections. Because the constitution then
continues with Article I, we have coded these articles as
sections in the 9002 article representing the Declaration of
Rights.]

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='MD'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895
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State-by-State Comparison Chart
8

SC
May 23, 1788

S.C. Const. art. I, § 22
(Apr. 16, 1868)

Addendum B
All persons have a right to be secure from unreasonable
searches or seizures of their persons, houses, papers or
possessions. All warrants shall be supported by oath or
affirmation, and the order of the warrant to a civil officer to
make search or seizure in suspected places, or to arrest one
or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, shall
be accompanied with a special designation of the persons or
objects of search, arrest or seizure; and no warrant shall be
issued but in the cases and with the formalities prescribed by
the laws.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='SC'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251
,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

9

NH
June 21, 1788

N.H. Const. art. I, § 19
(Sep. 5, 1792)

Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers,
and all his possessions; Therefore, All warrants to search
suspected places, or arrest a person for examination or trial,
in prosecutions for criminal matters, are contrary to this
right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in a
warrant to a civil officer to make search in suspected places,
or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their
property, be not accompanied with a special designation of
the persons or object of search, arrest, or seizure; and no
warrant ought to be issued but in cases and with the
formalities prescribed by law.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='NH'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

10

VA
June 25, 1788

Vir. Const. art. I, § 10
(1870)

That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may
be commanded to search suspected places without evidence
of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named, or whose offense is not particularly described and
supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and
ought not to be granted.

http://www.harbornet.com/rights/virginia.txt

11

NY
July 26, 1788

N.Y. Const. (Nov. 6,
1894)

*No search protection provided.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/Search.aspx
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State-by-State Comparison Chart
12

NC
Nov. 21,
1789

N.C. Const. art. I, § 15
(July 1, 1868)

Addendum B
General warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of
the act committed, or to seize any persons not named, whose
offence is not particularly described and supported by
evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought not to be
granted.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='NC'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

13

RI
May 29, 1790

R.I. Const. art. I, § 6
(May 3, 1843)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers
and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but on
complaint in writing, upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation and describing as nearly as may be, the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='RI'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251,
151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

14

VT
Mar. 4, 1791

Ver. Const. chap. I,
art. 11 (as established
July 9, 1793 and
amended through Nov.
5, 2002)

That the people have a right to hold themselves, their
houses, papers, and possessions, free from search or seizure;
and therefore warrants, without oath[s] or affirmation[s] first
made, affording sufficient foundation for them, and whereby
any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to
search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons,
his, her or their property, not particularly described, are
contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted.

http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/const2.htm; http://vermont-archives.org/govhistory/constitut/con93.htm

15

KY
June 1, 1792

Kent. Const. § 10 (as
ratified on Aug. 3,
1891, and revised Sep.
28, 1891)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and possessions, from unreasonable search and seizure; and
no warrant shall issue to search any place, or seize any
person or thing, without describing them as nearly as may
be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation.

http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/Legresou/constitu/010.htm
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TN
June 1, 1796

Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7
(adopted Feb. 23, 1870
and ratified on the
fourth Saturday of
Mar., 1870)
http://www.state.tn.us/
sos/bluebook/online/se
ction5/tnconst.pdf

Addendum B
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer may
be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence
of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named, whose offences are not particularly described and
supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought
not to be granted.

http://www.tngenweb.org/law/constitution1870.html

17

OH
Mar. 1, 1803

Ohio Const. art. I, § 14
(ratified Mar. 10,
1851)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and possessions, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person and things to be seized.

http://www.ohiohistory.org/onlinedoc/ohgovernment/constitution/cnst1851.html

18

LA
Apr. 30, 1812

Louis. Const. Bill Rts.,
Art. 2 (ratified Dec. 8,
1879)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='LA'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

19

IN
Dec. 11, 1816

Ind. Const. art. I, § 11
(ratified Nov. 1, 1851)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure,
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.

http://www.law.indiana.edu/uslawdocs/inconst/art-1.html#sec-11
http://www.statelib.lib.in.us/www/ihb/resources/constarticle1.html

20

MS
Dec. 10, 1817

Miss. Const. art. III, §
23 (adopted Nov. 1,
1890)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and
possessions from unreasonable seizure or search; and no
warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, specially designating the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized.

http://www.sos.state.ms.us/ed_pubs/Constitution/2007/Mississippi%20Constitution.pdf;
http://www.sos.state.ms.us/pubs/constitution/constitution.asp
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IL
Dec. 3, 1818

Ill. Const. art. II, § 6
(Aug. 8, 1870)
art. I., § 6 (ratified
1970)

Addendum B
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
without probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='IL'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251,
151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895

22

AL
Dec. 14, 1819

Ala. Const. art. I, § 6
(ratified Nov. 16,
1875)

That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and possessions from unreasonable seizure or
searches, and that no warrant shall issue to search any place,
or to seize any person or thing, without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation.

http://www.legislature.state.al.us/misc/history/constitutions/1875/1875_1.html

23

ME
Mar. 15,
1820

*Maine Const. art. I, §
5 (1820) (last modified
1/1/2003)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures;
and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or
thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/showASM.aspx?CID=176&AID=2001&SID=16654&MID=-1&key=search

24

MO
Aug. 10,
1821

Missouri Const. art. II,
§ 11 (1875)

That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures;
and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or
thing, shall issue without describing the place to be
searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as nearly as
may be; nor without probable cause, supported by written
oath or affirmation.

http://www.moga.mo.gov/const/A01015.HTM

25

AR
June 15, 1836

Ark. Const. art. II, §
15 (1874)

The right of the people of this State to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue, except upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/data/constitution/ArkansasConstitution1874.pdf
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MI
Jan. 26, 1837

Mich. Const. art. VI, §
26 (adopted Aug. 15,
1850)

Addendum B
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person
shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No
warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things,
shall issue without describing them, or without probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/historical/miconstitution1850.htm

27

FL
Mar. 3, 1845

Fla. Const. Decl. Rts.,
§ 22 (1885)
*art. I, § 12 as
amended in 1982

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and
searches, shall not be violated, and no warrants issued but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place or places to be searched,
and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized.

http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/conhist/1885con.html (Florida State University)

28

TX
Dec. 29, 1845

Tex. Const. art. I, § 9
(1876)

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and possessions from all unreasonable seizures or searches,
and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be,
nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.

http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/IART01.html (University of Texas at Austin - Tarton Law Library)

29

IA
Dec. 28, 1846

Iowa Const. art. I, § 8
(1857)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons and things to be seized.

http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Constitution.html#a1s8

30

WI
May 29, 1848

Wisc. Const. art. I, §
11 (1848)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

http://www.legis.state.wi.us/rsb/unannotated_wisconst.pdf
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31

CA
Sep. 9, 1850

Addendum B

Cal. Const. art. I, § 19 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
(ratified 1849) (revised papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
in 1879)
searches, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons and things to be seized.

http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/level3_const1849txt.html

32

MN
May 11, 1858

Minn. Const. art. I, §
10 (adopted 1857)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.

http://www.mnhs.org/library/constitution/transcriptpages/rt.html; http://www.mnhs.org/library/constitution/index.html

33

OR
Feb. 14, 1859

Ore. Const. art. I, § 9
(1859)

No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search or seizure; and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.

http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/constitution/orig/bill_rights3.htm

34

KS
Jan. 29, 1861

Kan. Const. Bill of
Rts, § 15 (adopted at
Wyandotte July 29,
1859)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons and
property against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inviolate, and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person and property to be
seized.

http://www.kshs.org/research/collections/documents/online/wyandotteconstitution.htm#billrights (Kansas State Historical Society)

35

WV
June 20, 1863

W.V. Const. art. II, § 3
(ratified Apr. 24,
1862)

The right of the citizens to be secure in their houses,
persons, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons and things to be seized.

http://www.wvculture.org/HISTORY/statehood/constitution.html (West Virginia Division of Culture and History);
http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/showASM.aspx?CID=225&AID=2977&SID=27352&MID=-1&key=search
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NV
Oct. 31, 1864

Nev. Const. art. I, § 18
(ratified Sep. 1, 1864)

Addendum B
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
on probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation,
particularly describing the place or places to be searched,
and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized.

http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Const/NvConst.html#Art1

37

NE
Mar. 1, 1867

Neb. Const. art. I, § 7
(1875).

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.

http://uniweb.legislature.ne.gov/legaldocs/view.php?page=c0101007000

38

CO
Aug. 1, 1876

Colo. Const. art. II, § 7
(adopted by
convention Mar. 14,
1876)

That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures;
and no warrant to search any place or seize any person or
thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched,
or the person or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
reduced to writing.

http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/archives/constitution/1876.pdf

39

ND
Nov. 2, 1889

N.D. Const. art. I, § 18
(Aug. 17, 1889)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons and things to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/showASM.aspx?CID=257&AID=3637&SID=34752&MID=-1&key=search
(Univ. of Maryland NBER/Maryland State Constitutions Project)

40

SD
Nov. 2, 1889

S.D. Const. art. VI, §
11 (ratified Oct. 1,
1889)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches any
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issued
but upon probable cause supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized.

http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='SD'&CID=223&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895
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MT
Nov. 8, 1889

Mont. Const. art. III, §
7 (ratified Oct. 1,
1889)

Addendum B
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes,
and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no
warrant to search any place or seize any person or thing
shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or
the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause,
supported by oath or aflirmation, reduced to writing.

http://www.umt.edu/Law/library/1889%20Montana%20Constitution.pdf

42

WA
Nov. 11,
1889

Wash. Const. art. I, § 7
(approved Oct. 1,
1889)

No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law.

http://www.secstate.wa.gov/history/constitution_view.aspx?i=1889

43

ID
July 3, 1890

Ida. Const. art. I, § 17
(ratified July 3, 1890)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized.

http://dfm.idaho.gov/cdfy2007/OtherDocuments/id-constitution.pdf

44

WY
July 10, 1890

Wyo. Const. art. I, § 4
(ratified Nov. 5, 1889)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to
be seized.

http://soswy.state.wy.us/informat/07Const.pdf

45

UT
Jan. 4, 1896

Utah Const. art. I, § 14
(adopted May 8, 1895
and ratified 1895)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

http://www.le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/66.htm
2 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled to Adopt a Constitution for the State of Utah 1856
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ADDENDUM C
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
(R82-85)
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James Swink #7998
Cache County Attorney
Tony C. Baird #7030
Deputy County Attorney
199 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
(435) 755-1860
E-mail: tony.baird@cachecounty.org

2111 Nov _
8 A/1 9: 46

fN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
ST ATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYfNG DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

VS.

Case No. 135100370
ZACHARY RIGBY,

Judge Brian G. Cannell

Defendant.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Having reviewed said motion with accompanying memorandum, the State's
memorandum in opposition, and having conducted a hearing on the matter, the Court
finds the following:
Defendant and the State have stipulated to certain facts of the case. On or about
March 28, 2013, Defendant was arrested after a search of his vehicle revealed marijuana
and drug paraphernalia, including a urine sample that tested positive for THC marijuana.
Defendant was initially stopped for a stop sign violation. After contacting the Defendant
(driver), the responding officer could immediately detect the odor of both burnt and fresh

marijuana coming from the vehicle. The Officer could also detect other physical
indicators of recent marijuana use. A short time later a canine unit arrived and the canine
positively indicated on the vehicle. Subsequently, a warrantless search was conducted,
wherein drugs and drug paraphernalia were located inside the vehicle.
Defendant concedes that prior to the warrantless search of his vehicle, probable
cause existed to believe that Defendant was in possession of controlled substances due to
the odor observed by the officer as well as the hit on the car by the canine. Defendant
also stipulates that Defendant was lawfully stopped pursuant to a traffic violation.
Defendant argues that despite the existence of probable cause, the State has failed to
establish that exigency existed to justify the officers in using the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement as a means to search the vehicle.
Defendant argues that according to State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, (Utah 1990),
the State has not met its burden to show that exigent circumstances existed because at the
scene of the search there were multiple officers present, the occupants of the vehicle
including Defendant were cooperative, and the officers had the technological capability
in their police cruisers to quickly obtain a warrant at the scene prior to the search, thereby
creating circumstances that were not exigent in nature.
The State however relies on State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, (Utah 1996),
wherein the facts are analogous to the present case. In Anderson the defendant's vehicle
was stopped and probable cause and exigent circumstances existed and the subsequent
search was found to be lawful. The Utah Supreme Court "has ruled that exigent
circumstances exist when the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained." Id. at 1237.

2

Despite the availability of equipment in the police cruisers at the scene, probable
cause and exigent circumstances existed in this case as a matter of fact. The officers
could smell marijuana, the canine unit hit on the vehicle, which further established
probable cause, and because the vehicle was mobile and the occupants were alerted to
police presence, exigent circumstances existed and the search validly fell under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
This Court also finds that as probable cause existed to question and search the
Defendant for illegal drugs, the vehicle is a natural extension of the person of the
Defendant. This Court also finds that although the arresting officer had the technological
means to attempt to obtain a warrant prior to the search of the vehicle, this Court will not
burden officers with using their mobile technology just because it exists in their vehicles.
This Court further finds that under the totality of the circumstances and in balancing the
interests of the State and the Defendant's privacy, the search of the vehicle in this matter
was reasonable and was therefore lawful and valid.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
Defendant's motion to suppress is denied as to the evidence obtained by law
enforcement officers during the warrantless search of defendant's vehicle, as the search
was reasonable under the circumstances and such evidence was lawfully obtained under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
DATED this

J\(2

day of __~-=-.;:;.___._ _ _ _ , 2013

District Court Judge

3

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that I emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the
defendant's attorney, Brandon Smith, to his email address of brandon@dtsattomeys.com.

A~o~
Legal Assistant

Dated November 7, 2013

